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ABSTRACT 
R&D drives innovation and productivity growth, but appropriability problems and financing 
difficulties likely keep R&D investment well below the socially optimal level, particularly in high-
technology industries. Though countries around the world are increasingly interested in using tax 
incentives and other policy initiatives to address this underinvestment problem, there is little empirical 
evidence comparing the effectiveness of alternative domestic policies and institutions at spurring 
R&D. Using data from a broad sample of OECD economies, we find that financial market rules that 
improve accounting standards and strengthen contract enforcement share a significant positive 
relation with R&D in more innovative industries, as do stronger legal protections for intellectual 
property. In contrast, stronger creditor rights and more generous R&D tax credits have a negative 
differential relation with R&D in more innovative industries. These results suggest that domestic 
policies directly dealing with appropriability and financing problems may be more effective than 
traditional tax subsides at promoting the innovative investments that drive economic growth. 
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1. Introduction 
There is extensive interest from policymakers and academic researchers alike in identifying the 
policies, laws, and institutions that promote private-sector investment in R&D (e.g., European 
Commission, 2003, 2004, & 2010; Hall and Van Reenen, 2000).  Two related factors motivate this 
interest. First, R&D is a key driver of innovation and productivity growth (e.g., Romer, 1990; Aghion 
and Howitt, 1992).  Second, there are strong theoretical reasons to expect that the private level of 
R&D investment falls well below the socially optimal level (e.g., Griliches, 1992; Hall, 1996; Jones 
and Williams, 1998).  
There are two main reasons for underinvestment in R&D.  The first is that because of weak or 
incomplete intellectual property protection, firms do not appropriate all of the returns to innovation, 
causing the social returns to R&D to be substantially higher than the private returns (see the survey in 
Hall, Mairesse, and Mohnen, 2010). The second reason is that financing constraints are likely 
pronounced for R&D investment (Brown, Martinsson, and Petersen, 2012). In particular, limited 
collateral value and asymmetric information between investors and firms can sharply curtail access to 
external finance, keeping R&D investment well below the level that would prevail if there were no 
capital market imperfections (e.g., Arrow, 1962; Hall, 2002). 
These appropriability problems and financing difficulties are likely particularly severe in high-
technology industries.  For example, appropriability problems are more pronounced for high-tech 
firms because they tend to focus on product innovation, the details of which are more difficult to 
conceal from competitors than that of process innovation. High-tech R&D is also more susceptible to 
financing constraints for several reasons, including more severe asymmetric information problems, 
greater uncertainty, and the fact that high-tech firms tend to exhaust internal finance given the 
magnitude of R&D investments (e.g., Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen, 2009).  An important 
consequence (and central to the tests in our study) is that if public policies directed at reducing capital 
market imperfections and appropriability problems are effective at promoting R&D, they should 
matter relatively more for R&D investment in innovative-intensive industries.   
Despite the recognition that economies underinvest in R&D, there is little comparative cross-
country evidence on the effectiveness of alternative policies and institutions at spurring innovation.  
This paper makes some initial progress by evaluating a broad set of country-level polices with the 
potential to move R&D closer to the socially optimal level. Our analysis focuses on: i) tax incentives 
for R&D investment, perhaps the most widely used innovation policy tool, ii) the strength of 
intellectual property (IP) protections, and iii) financial market rules that affect the availability of 
external financing and nature of financial intermediary development. 
We use a difference-in-differences approach to evaluate the association between these country-
level policies and investment in R&D. Our empirical tests build on the insights in Rajan and Zingales 
(RZ, 1998), who study how cross-country differences in financial market development affect 
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economic growth. As RZ (1998) note, if financial market development facilitates growth, it should be 
relatively more important for growth in the industries with a high innate, technologically-driven 
reliance on external financing. Extending this approach to our setting, we estimate the differential 
association between country-level policies and R&D investment across industries that differ in their 
innate innovative intensity. In keeping with the RZ approach, we use U.S. data to measure the innate 
innovative intensity of different industries because the U.S. has strong property rights, financial 
markets, and enforcement institutions.
1
  Specifically, we compute a measure we refer to as Innovative 
intensity, which is the ratio of R&D-to-sales for the median U.S. firm in each ISIC 2-digit industry. 
Notably, four key industries – chemicals, computers, communications technology, and scientific 
instruments – have an Innovative intensity far greater than all other industries in the sample.  
Consistent with other studies, we refer to these four industries as the “high-tech” sector.  
The dependent variable in our regressions is industry-level R&D investment across countries, 
compiled from the OECD’s STAN database. The main explanatory variables are interactions between 
country-level tax incentives, IP protection, and financial market rules and the industry Innovative 
intensity measure. The logic behind this test is that if IP protection and financial market rules promote 
R&D, the association will be relatively stronger in industries with a high Innovative intensity (e.g., 
high-tech) because appropriability and financing problems lead to a greater scope for policies and 
institutions to impact R&D in these sectors. This estimation strategy has many advantages, including 
the fact that by isolating within-country differences across industries, it controls flexibly for a wide 
array of unobserved factors at the country- and industry-levels that confound inference in policy 
studies.  Nonetheless, the potential endogeneity of some of the policies we study affects how we can 
interpret our findings, an issue we discuss in more detail below. 
To evaluate the effectiveness of tax incentives for R&D, we construct time-series measures of 
the generosity of R&D tax credits using user-cost estimates from the OECD (Thompson, 2009). We 
measure cross-national differences in the level of IP protection using an index of patent protections 
from Park (2008). We focus on the three financial market rules that Levine (1999) and Rajan and 
Zingales (2003) identify as the fundamental ingredients of a developed financial system: accounting 
standards, contract enforcement, and creditor rights. Stronger accounting standards and contract 
enforcement are important determinants of an economy’s supply of arm’s length financing (of both 
debt and equity), while creditor rights is more narrowly relevant for the supply of private credit.  As 
we review in the next section, there is considerable debate in the literature regarding whether better 
access to credit has a positive impact on innovation; our study sheds new light on this issue by 
                                                          
1
 As such, observed differences in innovative intensity across U.S. industries are less likely to be distorted by 
institutional factors, and thus more likely to reflect the fundamental characteristics of the industry. This also 
follows the approach Claessens and Laeven (2003) use to study how stronger private property rights influence 
growth in industries with more intangible assets. Other studies relying on U.S. data to measure an industry’s 
innovative intensity include Acharya and Subramanian (2009) and Ilyina and Samaniego (2011).  
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directly comparing how creditor rights and other financial market rules affect R&D investment across 
industries.  
Our final sample consists of roughly 5,600 observations over the period 1990 to 2006 for the 19 
OECD countries with information on industry-level R&D and the country-level polices and 
institutions noted above.  We report several findings new to the literature.  First, more generous tax 
treatment of R&D is associated with relatively less R&D investment in more innovative industries. 
Second, countries with stronger IP protections have relatively higher R&D levels in high-tech 
industries. Third, stronger accounting standards and better contract enforcement are associated with 
relatively more R&D investment in high-tech industries, whereas stronger creditor protection is 
associated with comparatively less high-tech R&D. Thus, financial market rules that increase the 
supply of arm’s length financing appear to be more effective than rules related specifically to private 
credit supply at promoting high-tech R&D.  
We conduct a number of additional tests to check robustness and explore the mechanisms 
underlying these findings.  First, instead of sorting industries based on the innovative intensity of U.S. 
firms, we estimate the difference-in-differences regressions using a high-tech dummy variable and 
find similar results.  We also find similar results if we collapse the time-dimension of the data and 
focus on the long-run connection between innovation policies and R&D investment.  Finally, we 
replace the innovative intensity measure with three other industry characteristics measured with U.S. 
data: the level of internal cash flow the typical firm generates, the amount of income taxes it pays, and 
its reliance on external finance. We find that stronger accounting standards are associated with 
relatively more R&D investment in industries where the typical firm generates less internal cash flow, 
pays lower income taxes, and is more dependent on external finance.  On the other hand, more 
generous tax credits for R&D share a relatively stronger relation with R&D in the industries that 
generate more internal cash flow, pay higher income taxes, and rely less on external finance.  These 
findings provide important insights on the mechanisms underlying our overall results.  In particular, 
since high-tech firms tend to generate less taxable income and internal finance, our findings suggest 
that polices affecting the availability of external finance are more important than policies providing 
more generous tax credits for R&D investment in the high-tech sector.  
Our study contributes to several different literatures on the institutions and tax policies that 
support innovative activity. Most research on the tax treatment of R&D focuses on estimating the 
overall tax price elasticity of R&D.
2
 Our contribution is to provide the first systematic cross-national 
study of the differential association between tax incentives and R&D investment in the economy’s 
high-tech sector. Since we focus on the differential effects of R&D tax credits across industries, our 
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 Early studies report a relatively weak R&D response to the introduction of an R&D tax credit in the US in 
1981 (e.g., Mansfield, 1986a).  More recent studies from a number of different countries tend to find stronger 
effects, though the magnitude and precision of the estimates vary (e.g., Hall, 1993; Bloom, Griffith, and Van 
Reenen, 2002; Berube and Mohnen, 2009; Czarnitzki, Hanel, and Rosa, 2011; Bond and Guceri, 2012; Lokshin 
and Mohnen, 2012; Cappelen, Raknerud, and Rybalka, 2012; Yang, Huang, and Hou, 2012; Rao, 2013).  
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baseline results are not directly comparable to the findings in the R&D tax credit literature. However, 
when we estimate the relation between the level of R&D and a measure of its tax treatment (user cost) 
across all countries and industries in our sample, we recover a positive and significant tax price 
elasticity for R&D, consistent with Bloom, Griffith, and Van Reenen (2002) and related studies. 
When we estimate this levels regression separately for subsamples of high- and low-tech industries, 
we find that reductions in the user cost are associated with higher levels of R&D investment in low-
tech but not high-tech industries. These findings reconcile our differential estimates with the overall 
effects documented in prior studies, while continuing to cast doubt on the effectiveness of tax credits 
at promoting R&D in industries where innovative investment is likely furthest below the socially 
optimal level.  
Our study also contributes to the literature that explores the real effects of stronger IP 
protection.  In a thorough review of the literature, Hall (2007) notes that fundamental questions about 
the importance of stronger IP protection for innovation remain unsettled.
3
 One challenge in 
identifying the impact of IP protections is the potential for alternative country-specific factors to drive 
both innovative activity and the strength of IP protection. By focusing on the differential effects of IP 
protection across industries within a given country, our approach makes progress in addressing 
concerns that left-out variables drive the empirical relation between IP protection and R&D. This 
evidence is particularly relevant given the growing controversy regarding the value of stronger IP 
protection (e.g., Lerner, 2009; Boldrin and Levine, 2013).   
Our findings also add to the growing literature on how laws and financial market rules that 
impact the supply of external finance affect innovative activity.
 
 The micro-level evidence in several 
studies suggests that financing constraints limit R&D investment, particularly in smaller, younger, and 
technology-intensive firms.
4
 Our study also points to an important connection between the availability 
of arm’s length financing and R&D, but our findings differ from prior studies in several ways. Most 
notably, we focus on the fundamental determinates of an economy’s supply of arm’s length financing 
and we directly compare the importance of these financial market rules with the effectiveness of IP 
protections and tax-based innovation policies.  
 Finally, given the importance of high-tech R&D for productivity growth and technological 
change, our findings also provide insights into the workings of the broader connections between 
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 Studies on the link between IP protection and innovative activity include Mansfield (1986b), Park and Ginarte 
(1997), Sakakibara and Branstetter (2001), Lerner (2009), Hall and Ziedonis (2001), Cohen et al. (2002), 
Kanwar and Evenson (2003), Branstetter, Fisman, and Foley (2006), Zhao (2006), Allred and Park (2007), Qian 
(2007), and Wang (2010). A related literature focuses on patenting decisions and subsequent real performance 
(e.g., Helmers and Rogers, 2011). 
4
 For example, see Hall (1992), Himmelberg and Petersen (1994), Bond, Harhoff, and Van Reenen (2005), 
Hyytinen and Toivanen (2005), Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen (2009), Czarnitzki and Hottenrott (2011), Brown, 
Martinsson, and Petersen (2012 & 2013), and Aghion et al. (2012). In addition to relaxing financing constraints, 
better access to arm’s length financing can facilitate innovation by both encouraging firms to pursue more novel 
innovations (Atanassov, Nanda, and Seru, 2007; Atanassov, 2015), and by reducing the incentives for firms to 
free-ride on the innovative efforts of competing firms (Yung, 2015). 
 
 
5 
institutions, finance, and aggregate economic performance explored in numerous studies (e.g., King 
and Levine, 1993; Aghion and Howitt, 2005; Levine, 2005; Brown, Martinsson, and Petersen, 2016). 
In particular, to the extent that prior studies like RZ (1998) and Levine (1999) link some of the 
financial market rules we focus on with economic growth, our work identifies a particular mechanism 
– more R&D investment in innovative-intensive industries – through which these fundamental 
determinants of capital market development are growth-enhancing. 
Having covered these contributions, let us be clear about the limitations of our work.  First, we 
limit the comparative analysis to tax credits, intellectual property protections, and a set of key 
determinants of financial market development. Our findings thus have nothing to say about the 
comparative effectiveness of other institutional and organizational factors at promoting R&D.
5
 
Second, our evidence shows how spending on R&D differs across institutional environments, but does 
not speak directly to the performance of these innovative investments. While most evidence suggests 
that the marginal returns to additional R&D investment are quite high (e.g., Hall, 2002), it is possible 
the mix of institutions and innovation policies also affects the productivity of R&D. We leave this 
topic for future research.  Finally, though our comparative analysis, rich set of fixed effects, and focus 
on the differential effects of innovation policy across industries makes progress in dealing with 
standard concerns about endogeneity and omitted factors, we do not have external instruments or a 
clean natural experiment to exploit for additional help with identification. It is thus prudent to be 
cautious in the way our findings are used and interpreted.   
2. Data, measurement, and differences across high- and low-tech industries 
2.1 R&D underinvestment in innovative intensive industries 
Appropriability problems and financing constraints are widely thought to cause 
underinvestment in R&D and there are strong reasons to believe this is particularly so in innovative 
intensive industries.  Appropriability problems are likely more pronounced in high-tech industries 
because R&D in new industries is typically focused on creating new products as opposed to process 
innovation (e.g., Teece, 1986, Figure 4).  The details of product innovation are likely much more 
difficult to conceal from competitors than the details of process innovation for obvious reasons (e.g., 
products are readily available for reverse engineering). In addition, product innovation in new 
industries often lacks complementary assets, which reduces the ability of firms to appropriate value 
(e.g., Teece, 1986).  These arguments suggest that IP protection should be more important for both 
product innovation as well as for R&D in high-tech industries.  Levin et al. (1987, Table 1) survey 
executives on strategies for appropriating the returns to R&D and report that patents are substantially 
more important for product innovation compared to process innovation.  A follow-up study by Cohen 
                                                          
5
 A non-exhaustive list of recent studies on other national and organizational determinants of R&D and 
innovation includes Acharya and Subramanian (2009), Manso (2011), Hillier et al. (2011), Brown and Floros 
(2012), Atanassov (2013), Ederer and Manso (2013), He and Tian (2013), Aghion, Howitt, and Prantl (2015), 
Aghion et al. (2014), Aggarwal and Hsu (2014), and Tian and Wang (2014). 
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et al. (2004) confirms this finding and also reports that executives view patents as more valuable for 
appropriating returns to R&D in high-tech industries (e.g., pharmaceutical, computers, medical 
instruments) compared to low-tech industries.
6
 
Capital market imperfections likely also matter more for R&D investment in innovative 
intensive industries.  One reason is simply that “cutting-edge” science is particularly difficult for 
investors to evaluate, leading to potentially severe asymmetric information problems in high-tech 
firms (e.g., Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen, 2009; O’Mahony and Vecchi, 2009; Czarnitzki and 
Hottenrott, 2011).  In addition, the nature of some forms of external financing – namely debt finance – 
are poorly suited for financing investments with high probability of failure but some chance of 
extremely high returns, characteristics of high-tech R&D.  Finally, R&D intensity in high-tech 
industries dwarfs that of low-tech industries, often forcing high-tech firms to exhaust internal finance 
and thus out of necessity turn to more costly external finance for funding marginal R&D investments.   
The notion that appropriability problems and financing constraints should matter more for high-
tech industries is central to the tests that follow.  In particular, they imply that policies and institutions 
that affect capital market development and the appropriability of intellectual capital should matter 
relatively more for R&D investment in innovative intensive industries. 
2.2 Sample construction   
To create our sample, we merge time-series observations on industry-level R&D investment 
from the OECD’s STAN database with country-level measures of R&D tax incentives, financial 
market rules, and IP protection collected from several different sources. The STAN database is 
attractive for our purposes for several reasons. Most importantly, it is the only data source we know of 
that provides internationally comparable estimates of R&D activity across industries and over time. In 
addition, the industry-level R&D figures in the STAN database capture the innovative activities of 
both private and public firms, overcoming a limitation of innovation studies that rely only on samples 
of public firms. Accounting for the full extent of R&D in an industry is essential for evaluating the 
more aggregated effects of alternative innovation policies.     
Table 1 reports variable descriptions, data sources, and overall sample statistics for the main 
variables we use in the study. The dependent variable in our main regressions is R&D-to-value added 
(R&D), reported in the STAN database at the 2-digit ISIC industry level.
7
 We also report results with 
R&D scaled by industry output rather than value added, but focus on results using R&D-to-value 
                                                          
6
 That said, there are potentially sharp differences in the importance of appropriability across the individual 
high-technology industries. In particular, appropriability (and therefore patent protection) is likely most 
important in the high-tech industries with innovations that are easy to imitate, and less important in the high-
tech industries with natural barriers to imitation, such as highly complex technologies or high set up costs. We 
thank an anonymous referee for bringing this issue to our attention. 
7
 In a few cases, the STAN database also reports R&D at a more disaggregated level (e.g., Pharmaceuticals 
(ISIC 2423) is reported separately from Chemicals (ISIC 24)). We focus on R&D at the 2-digit level to keep the 
level of aggregation consistent across industries, but all of our findings are as strong (or stronger) if we use the 
more disaggregated industry groupings when they are available.    
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added because it has better coverage in the STAN data.  For a country to be included in the study, we 
require that it have coverage of R&D in the STAN database and information on R&D tax incentives, 
financial market rules, and IP protection at the start of the sample period.  Finally, we drop the U.S. 
because we use the U.S. to construct measures of the innate characteristics of industries. The final 
sample consists of roughly 5,600 country-industry-year observations for 22 manufacturing industries 
in 19 countries over the period 1990 to 2006. The sample ends in 2006 due to the data we have on 
R&D tax credits.    
2.3 Measuring the tax treatment of R&D  
McFetridge and Warda (1983) develop the B-index and it is, to our knowledge, the only 
measure of the user cost of R&D that is available over time and across countries. The B-index flexibly 
captures a wide range of tax incentives for R&D, including deductions, allowances, and credits.  As 
discussed in Thompson (2009), the general formula for the B-index is: 
𝐵𝑖,𝑡 =
1 − 𝐴𝑖,𝑡
1 − 𝑇𝑖,𝑡
                                                                                                          (1) 
where T is the corporate income tax rate for country i at time t and A is the combined net present value 
of all reductions to tax liabilities resulting from a one dollar investment in R&D. The B-index 
therefore represents the present value of before-tax income a “representative” firm needs to generate 
to cover the cost of an additional $1 of R&D investment.  Clearly, the lower the B-index, the more 
generous is the tax treatment of R&D.                  
We use yearly estimates of the B-index from Thompson (2009, Tables 7 and 8).  In line with 
other studies using the B-index, we take one minus the B-index and simply call this variable R&D tax 
credits. Measured this way, a higher value of R&D tax credits means more generous tax treatment of 
R&D.  The next to last column in Table A.1 reports the average value of R&D tax credits for each 
sampled country over the 1990 to 2006 sample period. During this period Spain, Canada, and 
Australia are the most generous with tax incentives for R&D, while Germany, Italy, Sweden, Greece, 
Finland, Denmark, and Belgium are the least generous. 
In addition to tests using the level of R&D tax credits, we construct an indicator variable that 
tracks changes in tax credits following the approach that Acharya and Subramanian (2009) use to 
track changes in creditor rights. Specifically, for countries that introduce more generous R&D tax 
incentives during our sample period, the variable Change in tax credits starts at zero and increases by 
one in each year a new tax incentive is introduced. For countries that remove an R&D tax incentive in 
place at the beginning of our sample period, Change in tax credits starts at one and decreases to zero 
in the year the tax incentive is removed.  Finally, for countries with no change in R&D tax incentives 
during our sample period, either because they never have an R&D tax credit or because the tax credit 
in place at the start of the sample never changes, the Change in tax credits variable is set to zero 
throughout the sample period.  
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We recognize that it is challenging to estimate the causal impact of R&D tax credits.  In 
particular, estimates of the impact of tax incentives will be biased if governments strategically change 
R&D tax credits when the economy is doing poorly (Bloom, Griffith, and Van Reenen, 2002; Chang, 
2014). In the next section, however, we will present some suggestive evidence that this particular 
concern is not a problem; in particular, Figure 1 shows that there is no trend in the R&D differential 
across industries with high- and low Innovative intensity in the years before the introduction of more 
generous R&D tax incentives. In addition, our methodology makes some progress in dealing with this 
endogeneity concern because we include country-level time dummies in the regressions, and we 
estimate how the differential level of R&D between low- and high-tech industries responds to changes 
in R&D tax credits. 
2.4 Financial market rules  
Our focus on financial market rules follows the framework in Levine (1999) and Rajan and 
Zingales (2003). Notably, Levine (1999) concludes that stronger creditor rights, more effective 
contract enforcement, and more comprehensive and accurate financial reporting are fundamental 
determinants of an economy’s financial intermediary development.  Rajan and Zingales (2003, p. 18) 
identify a similar set of factors in their set of “essential ingredients” of a developed financial system; 
in particular, they also point out the importance of “an accounting and disclosure system that 
promotes transparency” and “a legal system that enforces arm’s length contracts cheaply”. We 
therefore focus on three key factors that determine the nature and extent of financial intermediation 
across countries: Accounting standards, Contract enforcement, and Creditor rights. In addition to 
following the approach in Levine (1999), these measures are attractive because we can obtain reliable 
cross-country estimates for each measure at the start of our sample period. We refer to these measures 
as “financial market rules.” Of the three financial market rules we study, Accounting standards and 
Contract enforcement are arguably the most important determinants of an economy’s supply of arm’s 
length financing. Moreover, while these measures support arm’s length contracting of all forms (debt 
and equity), Creditor rights is more narrowly relevant for the supply of private credit.  
Following RZ (1998), we focus heavily on Accounting standards, an index created by The 
Center for International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR) to measure the comprehensiveness 
of corporate annual reports. As the values in Table A.1 show, there is substantial cross-country 
variation in Accounting standards in our sample, with the highest values in Australia, Canada, 
Finland, Norway, Sweden and the U.K. Of the various measures of financial market development 
employed by RZ (1998) in their seminal study, Accounting standards is the most robust, as well as the 
measure they utilize most extensively.  In motivating the use of Accounting standards, RZ (1998) 
argue that “the higher the standards of financial disclosure in a country, the easier it will be for firms 
to raise funds from a wider circle of investors.”  We note that a “wider circle of investors” is a good 
description of arm’s length suppliers of finance, particularly equity finance, as opposed to private 
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lenders (e.g., bank loans). Notably, both RZ (1998) and Brown, Martinsson, and Petersen (2013) find 
that Accounting standards shares a strong positive correlation with country equity market activity, but 
not with credit market development.  
Our choice of Contract enforcement is motivated by the fact that several studies discuss the 
importance of efficient contract enforcement for facilitating arm’s length financial contracting (e.g., 
La Porta et al., 1997; Rajan and Zingales, 2003), and there is strong evidence linking an economy’s 
fundamental “contracting institutions” with financial intermediary development (e.g., Levine, 1999). 
Stronger contract enforcement appears to be particularly important for the development of arm’s 
length financing per se, as agents are forced to rely on monitored, reputation-based lending when 
contract enforcement is weak (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). Following Levine (1999) we use an 
index of Contract enforcement constructed by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) to 
measure how effectively a country’s legal system enforces contracts. The values for our sampled 
countries are reported in Table A.1.   
The last financial market rule is Creditor rights, a measure of creditor protection in the event of 
a default.  The Creditor rights measure was first proposed by La Porta et al. (1997 & 1998), and we 
use the values reported in Djankov, McLeish, and Shleifer (2007).  Across all country-years in our 
sample there are only four changes in Creditor rights, and three of these occur in the first five years of 
the sample. We thus use each country’s value for Creditor rights in 1995.8  Table A.1 shows large 
variation in Creditor rights across the countries in our sample, with values of zero in France and 
Mexico, values of only 1.00 in highly developed countries such as Canada, Finland, and Sweden, and 
strong creditor rights (3.00 or higher) in seven of the 20 countries. 
Relative to financial market rules that broadly facilitate access to arm’s length financing of all 
types, the importance of Creditor rights for innovative activity is less clear.  There are literatures 
suggesting three possible effects of stronger Creditor rights on innovation: i) little or no effect, ii) 
negative effect, and iii) positive effect. In the first literature, increased credit supply from stronger 
creditor protections may have little or no impact on high-tech R&D investments if firms rely primarily 
on equity to finance innovative investments (Hall, 2002; Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen, 2009). In the 
second literature, more creditor-friendly bankruptcy codes may harm innovation if it discourages firm 
risk-taking; indeed, Acharya and Subramanian (2009) show that stronger Creditor rights reduces 
patenting in more innovative-intensive industries. Finally, in the third literature, several recent studies 
show that innovative activity is positively related to within-country changes in the supply of credit 
(e.g., Aghion et al., 2012; Amore, Schneider, and Zaldokas, 2013; Cerqueiro et al., 2014). These 
findings suggest that, at least in some circumstances, stronger Creditor rights can foster innovation by 
increasing the supply of private credit. Clearly, more evidence on the impact of Creditor rights on 
                                                          
8
 Specifically, the value for Canada changes from 2 to 1 in 1992, the value for Finland changes from 3 to 1 in 
1993, and the value for Sweden changes from 2 to 1 in 1995. The only change after 1995 occurs in Japan, which 
moves from 3 to 2 in 2000. Our results are essentially identical if use the post-2000 value for Japan, or if we 
allow the Creditor rights value to change for these four countries.  
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innovation is needed, particularly its impact on high-tech R&D investment, which to our knowledge 
has not been examined in previous studies.  
 In the regressions that follow, we will assume that these predetermined “financial market 
rules”, all measured at the beginning of our sample period, are exogenous variables. This assumption 
has precedent in the literature.  In particular, Levine (1999) refers to rules and policies that promote 
better financial reporting and provide stronger contract enforcement as “the exogenous component of 
financial intermediary development”. In addition, Djankov, McLeish, and Shleifer (2007, Table A.1.) 
report that, over the period 1978-2004, the large majority of countries have no change in their 
measure of creditor rights (and the remaining countries have only limited changes). They conclude (p. 
307) that “the stability of creditor rights scores over time, and the absence of convergence across legal 
origins, is broadly consistent with the view that these particular measures of investor protection reflect 
relatively permanent features of the institutional environment, deeply rooted in national legal 
traditions.” Likewise, Acharya, Amihud and Litov (2011) take Creditor rights as predetermined and 
RZ (1998) argue that Accounting standards are largely exogenous given the lack of variation over 
time.  
2.5 Intellectual property protections 
To measure the strength of intellectual property protections, we collect information on patent 
rights from Ginarte and Park (1997) and Park (2008) and call this measure IP protection. This 
variable is an index based on a coding scheme applied to the various countries’ patent laws and 
includes five categories (Ginarte and Park (1997, p. 284)): i) extent of coverage, ii) membership in 
international patent agreements, iii) provisions for loss of protection, iv) enforcement mechanisms, 
and v) duration of protection. Each country receives a score ranging from 0 to 1 (with intermediate 
values possible) in each category and the IP protection index is the sum of the five categories. A 
higher value indicates stronger, more comprehensive IP protection, arguably allowing firms to 
appropriate more of the returns to their innovative efforts.
9
  The IP protection index is reported at 
five-year intervals, so in our sample the first value is in 1990 and the last value is in 2005.  Thus, to 
construct a full time-series over 1990 to 2006, we update the value of IP protection every five years.  
Like R&D tax credits, there is some concern that countries may change IP protection 
strategically (e.g., when R&D investment is relatively low, or when the high-tech sector is particularly 
influential).  Though we cannot fully address the endogeneity of IP protections, we do note that nearly 
all of the time-series variation in IP protection – which is substantial for some countries – appears to 
be caused by NAFTA and the WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS), both of which are arguably exogenous shocks to IP protection. Average values for 
the IP protection index appear in the second to last column of numbers in Table A.1. 
                                                          
9
 For more thorough discussions of the various issues associated with stronger IP protection, see Mansfield 
(1986b), Hall (2002), and Hall et al. (2014). 
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2.6 Measuring technological characteristics of industries 
Our approach tests for the differential effects of innovation policies across sectors that differ in 
their innate innovative intensity. Following the general approach that RZ (1998) use to proxy for an 
industry’s dependence on external finance, we construct a baseline measure of innate industry 
innovative intensity using data on publicly listed U.S. firms with coverage in Compustat. The logic 
for using U.S. data to create this measure is that the U.S. has not only the most developed capital 
markets for financing innovation, but also strong legal and enforcement institutions. The U.S. is also 
widely viewed as the most technologically advanced major economy in the world based on factors 
such as R&D/GDP. So the U.S should provide a good benchmark of cross-industry differences in 
innate innovative intensity.
 
Similar to the arguments in RZ (1998) and subsequent studies (e.g., 
Claessens and Laeven, 2003; Ilyina and Samaniego, 2011), we are not arguing that the U.S. provides 
the “right” absolute innate value for each industry, but rather actual innovation rates in U.S. firms 
reflect relative differences in fundamental innovative intensity across industries.   
To construct a baseline measure of industry innovative intensity we compute an R&D-to-sales 
ratio for each firm using total (summed) values of R&D investment and sales over the period 1990 to 
2000, and then call the median R&D-to-sales ratio across firms in each industry Innovative intensity. 
All of our inferences and results are similar if we measure Innovative intensity using R&D-to-total 
investment (R&D plus capital spending), R&D-to-book assets, or R&D per employee instead of the 
R&D-to-sales ratio. Values for Innovative intensity for all 2-digit ISIC manufacturing industries are 
listed in the third column of Table 2.  The average value for Innovative intensity is 0.037 with several 
“low-tech” industries (e.g., food products, apparel, wood products) having values below 0.010.  In 
contrast, four industries -- chemicals, computers, communications technology and scientific 
instruments (ISIC code 24, 30, 32, and 33, respectively) -- have Innovative intensity above 0.100, 
which is much greater than the values for any of the remaining 18 industries.  These four R&D-
intensive industries are routinely classified as constituting the high-technology sector (e.g., Hall, Jaffe, 
and Trajtenberg, 2001; Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen, 2012) and typically account for a very large 
share of the corporate R&D of most developed countries. 
This suggests a simple alternative to measure an industry’s technological intensity: we create an 
indicator variable for whether or not the industry is typically considered a part of the high-technology 
sector.  The variable High-tech is set equal to one for industries with ISIC code 24, 30, 32, and 33 and 
zero otherwise.  One advantage of the High-tech approach to identifying innovative industries (as 
opposed to Innovative intensity) is that the measure is not based on the activities of any single country 
(e.g., publicly traded US firms) and thus provides a good check of robustness. 
We also examine alternative industry characteristics to provide further checks on our main 
findings and inferences.  Following the approach we use to construct Innovative intensity, we use data 
from U.S. firms to compute industry measures of Cash flow, Income taxes, and External finance.  
Cash flow is equal to the median firm’s internally generated cash flow as a fraction of its total assets, 
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Income taxes is the median firm’s income taxes paid as a fraction of its total assets, and External 
finance is equal to the median firm’s (net) use of external financing relative to its total investment 
spending (R&D plus capital spending).    
The industry characteristics reported in Table 2 show that high-tech industries differ in several 
important ways from their non high-tech counterparts. First, as noted above, Innovative intensity is far 
larger in high-tech industries than in the non high-tech sector. Second, high-tech industries are far 
more dependent on external finance than other industries. Notably, on average, the External finance 
value is around three times larger for the high-tech sector compared to the non high-tech sector.  Cash 
flow, on the other hand, is much larger in the non high-tech sector, consistent with a relative lack of 
dependence on external finance.  Similarly, the non high-tech sector has a much higher measure of 
Income taxes. The pattern of values for External finance, Cash flow, and Income taxes suggests that 
financial market rules promoting arm’s length financing should be particularly important for R&D 
investment in high-tech industries, while more generous tax credits may matter more for the non high-
tech sector.      
 In Panel B of Table 2 we report cross-industry correlations between the alternative industry 
characteristics. Of particular note, Innovative intensity is strongly positively correlated with External 
finance and negatively correlated with Cash flow and Income taxes.  Furthermore, industries with high 
Cash flow and low External finance tend to also be industries with high Income taxes. These 
correlations are useful for interpreting the results from the difference-in-differences regressions that 
follow in the next section.   
3. Regression evidence on differential effects 
3.1 Difference-in-differences specification 
We employ a difference-in-differences approach pioneered by RZ (1998) and used in a number 
of subsequent studies to evaluate the causal connections between institutions and economic 
performance (e.g., Beck and Levine, 2002; Claessens and Laeven, 2003). The RZ approach makes 
progress in identifying the causal effects of country-specific characteristics by focusing on the 
differential impact a country-level variable has across industries with different innate, technological 
characteristics. Whereas RZ are interested in the differential effects of financial development across 
industries with varying dependence on external finance, we are interested in the differential effects 
innovation policies have across industries with varying Innovative intensity. Here, the identifying 
assumption is that if public policies are successful at promoting R&D, the effects will be relatively 
stronger in industries with a higher innate Innovative intensity. For example, for reasons already 
described, the nature of high-tech R&D should make it particularly sensitive to policies that affect 
capital market development and the strength of IP protection. That is, because innovative intensive, 
high-tech industries are relatively more prone to underinvestment, there is greater scope for public 
policy to impact their R&D investment. 
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Our primary regression is:  
R&Di,j,t= α(R&D tax creditsi,t× Innovative intensityj) + β(IP protectioni,t× Innovative intensityj) 
  + γ(Financial market rules
i
× Innovative intensity
j
) + η
j
+ η
i
× η
t
+ εi,j,t.                               (2)                              
In equation (2), R&Di,j,t is R&D investment divided by value added for industry j in country i in year 
t.  Innovative intensityj is industry j’s innovative intensity (which by construction does not vary across 
time or countries).  R&D tax creditsi,t is R&D tax credits in country i in year t and is measured as one 
minus the user cost of R&D (i.e., one minus the B-index). IP protectioni,t measures the level of patent 
protection in country i in year t. Financial market rulesi refer to either Accounting standards, 
Contract enforcement, or Creditor rights in country i. Finally, 𝜂𝑗  and 𝜂𝑖 × 𝜂𝑡  are sets of dummy 
variables that control for unobserved industry and country-year fixed effects, respectively. Notably, 
this fixed effects structure controls for any industry-level determinates of R&D intensity that are 
common across countries, as well as all time-varying country-specific factors that affect the overall 
propensity to invest in R&D, such as the level of economic development, political and regulatory 
environment, quality of research universities, and appetite for risk taking.
10
  In all cases we estimate 
equation (2) with robust standard errors clustered at the country level.
11
  
We focus on the interaction between industry Innovative intensity and country measures of 
R&D tax credits, IP protection, and Financial market rules.  We also estimate equation (2) using the 
High-tech dummy variable in place of Innovative intensity. In these difference-in-differences 
regressions, a positive coefficient on an interaction term indicates that an increase in a particular 
country-level characteristic is associated with a larger difference in the level of R&D investment 
between industries with high and low Innovative intensity.  We are thus evaluating whether the size of 
the within-country gap in R&D investment across industries with high and low Innovative intensity, 
varies with changes in R&D tax credits, IP protection, and Financial market rules. Since we lack 
meaningful time-series variation in financial market rules, for some regressions we collapse the time 
dimension of the data and estimate cross-sectional regressions using sample period averages.  
Our empirical approach helps deal with the endogeneity concerns noted in Section 2, though in 
some cases our estimates are best interpreted conservatively as conditional correlations. First, our 
regressions include a set of country-specific time dummy variables (𝜂𝑖 × 𝜂𝑡).  These controls partially 
alleviate the concern that countries strategically adjust R&D tax credits (or IP protection) when the 
                                                          
10
 Note that with these fixed effects make it is not necessary to include the uninteracted level of either industry 
Innovative intensity or the country policy rules in the regression equation. In addition, because the financial 
market rules we focus on are not time-varying, we cannot account for country-industry fixed effects in our 
baseline specifications. We do, however, report results with country-industry fixed effects for regressions that 
exclude the financial market rules.    
11
 We also explored bootstrapping the standard errors (using resampling with replacement and 50 replications) 
and using two-way clusters at the country and year level. In each case the standard errors were uniformly 
smaller than those generated by clustering in the country dimension. We thus report results using the more 
conservative approach. 
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economy (and R&D) is performing poorly. Second, we are estimating the differential relation between 
the policy variables and R&D across low and high-tech industries. As such, if endogeneity is a 
problem for our estimates, it has to be the case that endogeneity biases the results more for one sector 
than another.  Finally, we simultaneously evaluate the effects of alternative policy variables. In 
addition to addressing concerns about omitted variables, evidence of differing but theoretically 
plausible effects for the alternative policy variables supports a stronger, causal inference.
12
  
3.2 Baseline results 
In Table 3 we report OLS estimates of equation (2).  We postpone to Table 5 a discussion of 
economic magnitudes implied by the estimates. We begin in column (1) by including only the 
interaction between Innovative intensity and the level of R&D tax credits.  The coefficient estimate on 
the interaction term is negative and statistically significant, indicating that more generous tax 
treatment of R&D is associated with relatively less R&D investment in more highly innovative 
industries.  We find similar evidence in column (2) after replacing the level of R&D tax credits with 
the Change in tax credits variable. Namely, the negative and significant coefficient on the Change in 
tax credits x Innovative intensity interaction indicates that the within-country difference in R&D 
across high- and low-innovation industries decreases following an increase in the generosity of R&D 
tax incentives compared to similar changes in R&D differentials in countries without a simultaneous 
change in R&D tax incentives. As Acharya and Subramanian (2009) discuss in the context of changes 
in creditor rights, triple difference-in-differences evidence of this type offers particularly compelling 
evidence that policy changes have causal effects. For example, to explain away this finding one has to 
believe that countries systematically introduce more generous tax incentives in anticipation of a 
relative decline in R&D investment between high- and low-innovative sectors. 
A related concern with the tax credit findings is the potential for pre-trends: the gap in R&D 
across high- and low-innovation industries could have been trending downward prior to the policy 
change. We evaluate this possibility in Figure 1. Here, we show how R&D investment in the most 
innovative industries (top 25 percent in Innovative intensity) and least innovative industries (bottom 
25 percent) evolves in the years surrounding increases in the generosity of R&D tax incentives. 
Specifically, we find the average level of R&D in each group of industries (after removing country-
year fixed effects), and normalize each series to start at a magnitude of zero. (Note that in absolute 
terms, R&D intensity is substantially higher in the more naturally innovative industries.) The figure 
shows that there are no trends in R&D in either high- or low-innovative industries prior to the 
implementation of R&D tax incentives (at t = 0). In particular, the significant negative R&D 
                                                          
12
 It is also possible that there are important complementarities in the effects of the alternative policy variables. 
We have explored this possibility by adding triple interaction terms to equation 2. In each case, the triple 
interaction term is insignificant and the estimates on our main (double) interaction terms are unchanged, 
suggesting, at a minimum, that our conclusions are not biased by complementarities across the key factors.  
More direct evidence on complementarities in R&D policies and institutions is an important topic for future 
research. 
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differential across high- and low-innovative industries does not emerge until after the tax credits are in 
place, at which time the differential exhibits a consistent downward trend. The lack of any pre-trends 
supports the validity of our difference-in-differences approach.
13
 
In column (3) we focus only on the interaction term IP protection x Innovative intensity. The 
point estimate on the IP protection interaction term is positive and statistically significant, indicating 
that moving from a low to a high IP protection country is associated with a significant increase in the 
differential R&D intensity across high and low Innovative intensity industries.  
In column (4) we include only the Accounting standards x Innovative intensity interaction. The 
coefficient estimate on the interaction term is positive and statistically significant, indicating that 
stronger Accounting standards are associated with relatively higher levels of R&D investment in more 
innovative industries.   
In columns (5) and (6) we simultaneously evaluate the full set of policy variables. In column 
(5) we use the level of R&D tax credits, and in column (6) we use the Change in tax credits.  In either 
case, we continue to find negative and significant differential effects of more generous R&D tax 
incentives on R&D investment across industries with varying Innovative intensity. Similarly, we 
continue to find significant positive differential effects of stronger IP protection and Accounting 
standards in the full specification.  
The regressions in Panel B are identical to Panel A except we replace Innovative intensity with 
the High-tech dummy variable.  Consistent with the evidence in Panel A, we find a negative 
coefficient on the interaction between High-tech and the level of R&D tax credits, though this 
coefficient is no longer statistically significant. Stronger IP protection and Accounting standards, 
however, are associated with significantly higher rates of R&D in high-tech compared to low-tech 
industries.  Thus, we reach the same qualitative conclusions when we switch from the continuous, 
U.S.-based measure of Innovative intensity to the dichotomous and non-US specific high-tech/non-
high-tech approach. 
3.3 Alternative financial market rules: Contract enforcement and creditor rights 
In Table 4 we explore the relation between R&D investment and two other financial market 
rules discussed above: Contract enforcement and Creditor rights.  In the regressions that follow, we 
continue to include IP protection and the measures of R&D tax credits in the difference-in-differences 
specification. In regressions (1), (3), and (5), the coefficient estimate on the level of R&D tax credits 
is negative, although statistically significant only in regression (3).  In regressions (2), (4), and (6), the 
estimates for Change in tax credits are negative, statistically significant, and similar in magnitude to 
the values in Table 3.  Similarly, the coefficient estimates for IP protection in all regressions are 
positive, statistically significant, and similar in magnitude to the estimates in Table 3.   
                                                          
13
 Unfortunately, we are not able to explore pre-trends in the other policy variables. The financial market rules 
exhibit almost no variation and are measured at the start of our sample period, while the IP protection index 
only updates at five-year intervals, making it impossible to identify the exact year in which changes occur. 
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Turning to the alternative financial market rules, in the first two regressions we estimate 
equation (2) using Contract enforcement in place of Accounting standards. In each case, the estimated 
coefficient on the Contract enforcement x Innovative intensity interaction term is positive and 
statistically significant, consistent with our findings for Accounting standards in Table 3. The 
regressions in columns (3) and (4) use Creditor rights in place of Accounting standards in our 
baseline regression. In sharp contrast to the strong positive estimates for Accounting standards and 
Contract enforcement, the coefficient estimates on the Creditor rights x Innovative intensity 
interaction term are negative (though statistically insignificant).   
In the last two regressions in Table 4 we include the full set of financial market rules in the 
same regression. In this specification we continue to find positive and significant effects on the 
Accounting standards and Contract enforcement interaction terms, suggesting that these alternative 
financial market rules contain unique information about the fundamental financial market 
characteristics that promote R&D. In contrast, the negative estimates for Creditor rights are 
substantially larger (in absolute value), and become statistically significant. These estimates indicate 
that after conditioning on a country’s level of Accounting standards and Contract enforcement, 
stronger creditor rights is associated with a smaller gap in R&D investment between high and low 
innovative-intensive industries.  
As always, establishing causality is a challenge, particularly when evaluating policy variables 
in a cross-country context. Yet, almost all reasonable concerns about endogeneity of institutions or 
omitted factors that we can think of would have trouble rationalizing our full set of results. In 
particular, we find different effects for different types of financial market rules. Most notably, stronger 
creditor rights share a much different relationship with R&D than stronger accounting standards or 
stronger contract enforcement, and these differences are consistent with theory (e.g., arm’s length 
financing is better suited than private credit for financing high-tech innovation).  
 3.4 Quantifying economic magnitudes  
In Table 5 we report alternative estimates of the economic magnitude implied by our difference-
in-differences estimates. We focus on the implied differential effects from the final specification in 
Table 4 (column (6)). The reported differentials compare how (all else equal) a change in the policy 
variable from the 25
th
 to 75
th
 percentile affects the gap between R&D investment across industries 
with different Innovative intensity. In the first two rows we compute the predicted R&D differentials 
by following the approach in RZ (1998) and comparing industries at the 75
th
 percentile and 25
th
 
percentile in Innovative intensity. In our sample, the industry at the 75
th
 percentile (Machinery and 
equipment, not including office and computing equipment) and the industry at the 25
th
 percentile 
(Leather) are both non high-tech sectors, so this approach focuses on the size of the gap in R&D 
intensity between two non high-tech industries.  In the first row, we report the size of this differential 
effect relative to the sample average R&D intensity, and in the second row we report the effect 
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relative to the sample median.  Depending on the scale factor, our estimates suggest that the 
introduction of more generous R&D tax credits (a one unit increase in Change in tax credits) reduces 
the gap between R&D in a sector like Machinery and equipment compared to a sector like Leather by 
an amount equivalent to 2% of the sample average R&D intensity or 7% of the sample median. Using 
the same approach, stronger IP protection is associated with an increase in the R&D gap between 
relatively high- and low-innovative sectors that amounts to 3% (8%) of the sample average (median) 
R&D. The corresponding values from increases in Accounting standards (3% and 9%), Contract 
enforcement (5% and 15%), and Creditor rights (-5% and -14%) suggest slightly larger economic 
effects from changes in the financial market rules.  
While the approach in the first two rows is the standard way to quantify economic effects, it 
does not reflect the differential we have most emphasized, which is the gap in R&D between high-
tech and low-tech industries.  In the final two rows we thus compute the predicted R&D differentials 
by comparing R&D investment in the average high-tech industry to the average low-tech industry.  
We report the size of this differential effect as a percentage of both the sample average R&D in high-
tech industries (third row) and the sample average gap in R&D across high- and low-tech industries 
(fourth row).  In the first column, an increase in R&D tax credits is associated with a reduction in the 
gap between R&D in the high- and low-tech sector that amounts to 6% of sample average R&D in 
high-tech industries (or 7% of the sample average gap between high- and low-tech R&D). Similarly, 
stronger IP protection, Accounting standards, and Contract enforcement are all associated with 
significant increases in the gap between high- and low-tech R&D.  In particular, the difference in 
R&D across high- and low-tech industries is larger in a country at the 75
th 
percentile in Accounting 
standards (Contract enforcement) compared to a country at the 25
th
 percentile by an amount 
equivalent to 9% (15%) of the sample average gap in high-tech versus low-tech R&D.  In contrast, the 
corresponding effect from stronger Creditor rights is a 14% reduction in the difference between high- 
and low-tech R&D. These estimates suggest that the policy variables we focus on are associated with 
R&D activity in an economically important way.        
4. Alternative approaches and additional evidence on innovation policies and R&D 
4.1 Regressions using collapsed (long-run) data 
         As discussed above, there is no meaningful time-series variation for our three financial market 
rules. We therefore consider an alternative estimation approach: we collapse the time dimension of 
our variables by computing averages (for those variables with time-series variation) and then estimate 
the difference-in-differences regression using purely cross-sectional observations. While this 
approach is useful for testing how initial financial market rules relate to subsequent (long-run) levels 
of R&D investment, it cannot be used for estimating how changes in the generosity of tax credits 
affect R&D.  Nonetheless, we estimate a specification that mirrors equation (2), except the country-
industry level of R&D and the country levels of R&D tax credits and IP protection are averaged 
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across the full sample period.  In addition, since we remove the time-series variation, we use a full set 
of country dummies in place of the country-year dummies.  The results are reported in Table 6 with 
standard errors clustered in the country dimension.   
            The first four regressions in Table 6 are the counterparts to regressions (1), (3), (4) and (5) of 
Table 3. The first regression in Table 6 includes only the interaction between R&D tax credits and 
Innovative intensity and the estimated coefficient is negative, statistically significant, and somewhat 
larger (in absolute value) than the corresponding estimate in Table 3. The next regression focuses only 
on IP protection and the estimate for the IP protection x Innovative intensity interaction is statistically 
significant and considerably larger than the corresponding estimate in Table 3.  In the third regression, 
we include only Accounting standards and find coefficients that are positive, statistically significant, 
and nearly identical in magnitude to the counterpart regressions in Table 3. Regression (4) in Table 6 
includes all three of the interactions noted above.  The coefficient estimates in this regression are quite 
similar to the estimates in the corresponding regression (fifth column) in Table 3; the estimate for the 
R&D tax credit interaction in Table 6, however, is no longer significant.  The fifth regression in Table 
6 adds Contract enforcement and Creditor rights and thus corresponds to regression (5) in Table 4.  
Once again, the point estimates across these corresponding regressions are very similar.  Finally, in 
column (6) we estimate the full specification using averages computed over the 1990s rather than over 
the full sample period, and continue to draw similar inferences about the (long-run) relation between 
financial market rules and R&D investment in highly innovative industries.  Thus, the only notable 
impact from collapsing the data is a loss of precision on the estimates for R&D tax credits and IP 
protection in some specifications.      
4.2 Other industry characteristics 
 In Table 7, we examine the differential link between the country policy variables and R&D 
investment using industry characteristics other than the innovative intensity measures.  In the first two 
columns of Table 7 we replace Innovative intensity with the measure of industry dependence on 
external finance (External finance).  Of course we expect that financial market rules should matter 
relatively more in industries with high external finance dependence. In fact, the coefficient estimate 
for Accounting standards is positive and statistically significant, consistent with our expectations 
regarding financial market rules.  Furthermore, there is a negative differential for R&D tax credits (as 
well as Change in tax credits) showing that more generous tax treatment of R&D has relatively 
weaker effects on R&D in sectors that depend more on external finance. 
 In the middle two columns (3 and 4) and the final two columns (5 and 6) of Table 7, we replace 
Innovative intensity with industry Cash flow and Income taxes, respectively.  If we are interpreting the 
findings for Innovative intensity (and High-tech) correctly, then we expect to find the opposite 
differential effects if we substitute industry measures of internally generated funds and income taxes 
paid for Innovative intensity. Since stronger financial market rules should increase access to arm’s 
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length financing, the impact of stronger rules should decline in importance the more plentiful an 
industry’s internally generated finance (as well as income taxes paid) and thus the less need for 
outside funds. On the other hand, more generous tax credits should matter most in profitable 
industries where income taxes are high, and thus tax credits are more valuable.  Based on Table 2, we 
know that more innovative intensive industries are more reliant on external finance, generate less 
internal cash flow, and pay lower income taxes compared to less innovative industries. 
 As expected, the estimates in columns (3)-(6) show that more generous tax treatment of R&D is 
associated with relatively more R&D investment in industries with higher levels of cash flow and 
income taxes.  In contrast, negative coefficients on the Accounting standards and IP protection 
interactions show that stronger Accounting standards and IP protection matter relatively less in 
industries with high cash flows and greater income tax payments.  The findings in Table 7 are 
particularly helpful for shedding light on why we obtain a negative effect for the R&D tax credits 
interaction in our main regressions: R&D tax credits have relatively weaker effects in more innovative 
industries because income tax burdens are lower in these industries.  We will explore the tax credit 
findings in more detail in Table 9.  
 4.3 Other robustness checks 
  In Table 8 we report a number of robustness checks for our main results. In the first two 
columns, we check the robustness of our dependent variable to scaling R&D by output (instead of 
value added).  All three interaction variables are statistically significant and have the same pattern of 
coefficients as reported in our main tables.  In the next two columns we compute Innovative intensity 
based on 1980s data (instead of the 1990s) and continue to employ the same dependent variable as 
used in our previous tables (R&D).  The estimated coefficients for all three interactions are consistent 
with our baseline findings, the only notable difference being that the negative coefficient on the level 
of R&D tax credits is not as precisely estimated and is no longer statistically significant.   
 In columns (5) and (6) we add two additional control variables: GDP per capita x Innovative 
intensity and Schooling x Innovative Intensity.  The logic for these additional variables is to control 
for the possibility that a country’s standard of living or level of human capital might be both: i) 
correlated with the tax credits, IP protection, and financial market rules we study, and ii) differentially 
important for R&D investment in the high-tech sector.  When these additional controls are added to 
the regression, the estimated coefficients for the three main policy interactions are statistically 
significant and the point estimates are very similar to the corresponding regressions in Table 3 
(regressions (5) and (6)). 
 In columns (7) and (8) we address the potential concern that country-level policy changes are 
correlated with changes in R&D investment opportunities at the country-industry-year level by adding 
the industry’s forward rate of value added growth to the baseline regression. This is a particularly 
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strong control for differences in industry growth options across countries and over time.
14
 Although 
we lose a number of observations when including the control for time variation in industry growth 
rates, our main inferences are not affected.   
 Finally, in columns (9) and (10) we estimate the baseline specification with country-industry 
fixed effects. Since there is no time-series variation in Accounting standards for a given country-
industry pair, the Accounting standards x Innovative intensity interaction falls out of the regression 
when the country-industry fixed effects are included.  For R&D tax credits and patent protections – 
which do vary somewhat over time – the estimates with country-industry effects are generally 
consistent with the other estimates, though the coefficients on the tax credit interactions are no longer 
statistically significant. For patent protections, however, we continue to recover a positive and 
significant coefficient on the key interaction term, even with the richer fixed effects structure.  
Overall, these results support the main findings that patent protections have a significant positive 
differential impact on R&D in more innovative industries, while tax credits do not. 
5. Additional evidence on tax credits and R&D 
In this section we explore in more detail what drives the negative differential effect of R&D tax 
credits in highly innovative industries.  Our evidence indicating that R&D tax credits have a negative 
differential association with R&D investment across high and low Innovative intensity industries is 
not necessarily at odds with a fairly substantial literature that finds a positive responsiveness of R&D 
investment to the introduction of R&D tax credits (e.g., Hall, 1993; Bloom, Griffith, and Van Reenen, 
2002). While this literature shows that tax credits are associated with overall R&D increases, our 
findings indicate that the increases are, on average, relatively weaker in more innovative sectors.   
To explore this finding in more detail, we use our industry level data to estimate a levels 
regression broadly similar to the approach in prior studies. The regression equation is:  
log(R&D) 
i,j.t
= αlog(Output)
i,j,t
+ βlog(B-index)
𝑖,𝑡
 +  η
i
+ η
j
+ η
t
+ εi,j,t                                    (3) 
Here, Output is industry output for each country-industry-year. We include the log of the B-index 
rather than the log of the R&D tax credits variable we used earlier to be consistent with the approach 
of regressing R&D on its user cost (and to avoid losing observations when taking the log). Although 
other studies use different calculations of the user cost of R&D, the main finding from this literature is 
that a lower after-tax cost of R&D increases the overall level of R&D, suggesting a negative estimate 
of β.  Equation (3) also includes country, industry, and year fixed effects.  
We report estimates of equation (3) in Table 9.  We report separate results for all industries 
(column (1)), non high-tech industries (column (2)), and high-tech industries (column (3)).  In the 
regression with all industries, and in the regression with only non high-tech industries, we find a 
                                                          
14
 This approach follows several prior studies (e.g., Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach, 2004). The results are 
similar if we replace the forward growth rate with contemporaneous and/or lagged values.  
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negative and statistically significant coefficient on the user cost term, consistent with previous studies. 
However, in the regression using data only for high-tech industries, we find a positive but very small 
and insignificant coefficient on the B-index. Together, these results suggest that the impact of more 
generous tax treatment of R&D (lower user cost) is confined entirely to non high-tech industries.  This 
finding is useful for interpreting the differential results we documented earlier: more generous tax 
treatment of R&D has a negative differential effect across high- and low-tech industries because R&D 
increases only in less innovative industries.    
There are multiple reasons why R&D tax credits may matter very little for R&D investment in 
high-tech industries. One obvious reason is that compared to the low-tech sector, high-tech firms pay 
much lower corporate income taxes (see Table 1), making tax credits less effective (on average) in 
this sector.  This explanation is supported by our findings in Table 7 showing a positive differential 
effect of tax credits in industries with higher cash flows and income taxes.  An alternative explanation 
-- which we cannot entirely dismiss -- is that countries introduce more generous R&D tax incentives 
when R&D investment in high-tech is expected to lag behind R&D in other sectors.   
6. Conclusions  
Given the growing fears that many countries around the globe have entered a period of 
secular stagnation, it is important to understand what public policies are effective at promoting R&D 
investment. We focus on high-tech R&D because it is arguably particularly sensitive to 
appropriability and financing problems, and thus the sector where innovative investment is most 
likely to fall far below the social optimum.  We use international data and a difference-in-differences 
approach to evaluate the comparative effectiveness of a broad set of country policies and institutions 
at encouraging R&D investment in the high-tech sector. We find that stronger accounting standards 
and contract enforcement at the national level share a positive differential association with R&D 
investment in more innovative industries, while the opposite is true for stronger creditor rights.  
Stronger IP protection is also associated with differentially higher rates of R&D investment in high-
tech industries.  In contrast, more generous R&D tax credits are associated with relatively more R&D 
in non high-tech industries, consistent with high-tech industries paying comparatively little taxes.  
Overall, our findings suggest that policies that directly deal with appropriability and financing 
problems are much more effective at promoting high-tech R&D compared to traditional tax subsidies. 
Our findings on IP protection are important because fundamental questions remain 
concerning the desirability and effectiveness of stronger IP protection. For example, the counter 
agenda, sometimes referred to as the “New International IP Agenda” (see Schultz and Walker, 2005), 
argues that IP protection is often too strong, may impede innovation, and is harmful to developing 
countries. Our findings indicate a positive link between IP protection and R&D in high-tech 
industries, an important consideration in any discussion of the pros and cons of weakening IP 
protection.   
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To our knowledge, this paper provides the most comprehensive examination of the role of 
financial market rules in promoting R&D investment.
15
 Financial market rules that improve access to 
external financing may be particularly effective at promoting R&D because firms in more innovative 
industries frequently have investment levels well in excess of internal finance. But different financial 
market rules are likely to have different impacts on high-tech R&D as this sector is funded principally 
by equity finance (both cash flow and stock issues) rather than credit (Hall, 2002).  Consistent with 
this idea, we find that stronger creditor rights is negatively associated with R&D investment in the 
high-tech sector while stronger accounting standards and contract enforcement  -- financial market 
rules that are particularly important for equity finance -- share a positive robust relation with high-tech 
R&D.   
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
15
 One qualification is that our study does not speak at all to the costs that may be associated with implementing 
and enforcing such rules. 
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Figure 1. This figure plots trends in R&D investment across industries with high- and low Innovative 
intensity in the years surrounding the introduction of more generous R&D tax incentives. The values 
reflect the average level of R&D in high and low innovative industries after removing country-year 
fixed effects and normalizing each series to start at zero. High Innovative intensity industries (dashed 
line) have an Innovative intensity in the top 25
th
 percentile of industries listed in Table 2, and low 
Innovative intensity industries (dotted line) have an Innovative intensity in the bottom 25
th
 percentile. 
The solid line represents the difference in (residual) R&D intensity across the high and low industry 
groupings.  
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Table 1 
Variable descriptions and sample summary statistics 
 
Variable name Description Source Mean 25th Median 75th 
Std. 
Dev 
R&D Industry research and development expenditures scaled by value 
added. Reported at the country, industry, year level from 1990 to 
2006. 
OECD STAN Database 0.060 0.006 0.020 0.067 0.094 
R&D tax credits  Equal to 1 - B-index, where the B-index measures the user cost of 
R&D. A higher value implies more favorable tax treatment of 
R&D. Reported at the country, year level from 1990 to 2006. 
OECD and Thompson 
(2009) 
0.065 -0.020 0.000 0.110 0.117 
Change in tax credits A variable indicating a change in R&D tax credits. The variable 
starts at zero (one) and increases (decreases) by one in each year 
a country’s R&D tax credits increase (decrease). 
OECD and Thompson 
(2009) 
0.399 0 0 1 0.733 
IP protection An index of the degree of legal patent protection in a country 
based on five categories: i) extent of coverage, ii) membership in 
international patent agreements, iii) provisions for loss of 
protection, iv) enforcement mechanisms, and v) duration of 
protection. Reported every five years from 1990 to 2006. We use 
the same value for each five year period. 
Ginarte and Park (1997) 
and Park (2008) 
4.135 3.883 4.333 4.542 0.541 
Accounting standards An index of the comprehensiveness of corporate annual reports 
constructed by the Center for International Financial Analysis 
and Research (CIFAR). We take the index value in 1990 (divided 
by 10).   
CIFAR and Levine 
(1999) 
6.537 6.20 6.40 7.40 1.01 
Contract enforcement A measure of how effectively the legal system enforces 
contracts. Constructed by the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) and averaged over 1982 to 1995.  
ICRG and Levine (1999) 8.901 8.59 9.17 9.58 0.920 
Creditor rights An index aggregating different creditor rights. We take the index 
value in 1995. 
Djankov, McLeish and 
Shleifer (2007) 
1.877 1.000 2.000 3.000 1.082 
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Variable name Description Source Mean 25th Median 75th 
Std. 
Dev 
Innovative intensity The ratio of R&D-to-sales for the median US firm in each ISIC 2-
digit industry. Both R&D and sales are summed over the period 
1990-2000 prior to computing the ratio. 
Compustat 0.037 0.007 0.012 0.023 0.064 
External finance  The ratio of net external finance (gross stock issues – stock 
buybacks + new long-term debt issues – long-term debt 
reductions) to total investment spending (R&D + capital spending) 
for the median US firm in each ISIC 2-digit industry. Both 
numerator and denominator are summed over the period 1990-
2000 prior to computing the ratio. 
Compustat 0.361 0.223 0.346 0.510 0.294 
Cash flow The ratio of internally generated cash flow (operating income 
before depreciation)-to-total assets for the median US firm in each 
ISIC 2-digit industry. Both numerator and denominator are 
summed over the period 1990-2000 prior to computing the ratio. 
Compustat 0.095 0.093 0.110 0.116 0.057 
Income taxes The ratio of total income taxes paid-to-total assets for the median 
US firm in each ISIC 2-digit industry. Both numerator and 
denominator are summed over the period 1990-2000 prior to 
computing the ratio. 
Compustat 0.014 0.009 0.010 0.014 0.015 
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Table 2 
Industry characteristics 
This table lists the 2-digit ISIC industries included in the study. The industries in bold (24, 30, 32, and 
33) comprise the high-technology sector of manufacturing. The industry characteristics reported in 
columns (3)-(6) are based on the activities of US firms over the period 1990 to 2000. The variables 
are described in Table 1.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Industry characteristics 
ISIC 
code 
Industry 
Innovative 
intensity 
External 
finance 
Cash flow Income taxes 
15 Food products 0.0065 0.3555 0.1129 0.0104 
16 Tobacco 0.0045 -0.3522 0.1889 0.0759 
17 Textiles 0.0127 0.2415 0.1200 0.0099 
18 Apparel 0.0000 0.8201 0.0969 0.0139 
19 Leather 0.0069 0.0018 0.1084 0.0280 
20 Wood 0.0048 0.0693 0.1136 0.0173 
21 Paper 0.0097 0.2233 0.1267 0.0165 
22 Publishing 0.0082 0.4398 0.1165 0.0145 
23 Petroleum 0.0057 0.2316 0.1017 0.0104 
24 Chemicals 0.2748 1.0261 -0.1242 0.0000 
25 Rubber and plastics 0.0139 0.3508 0.1251 0.0066 
26 Non-metallic minerals 0.0116 0.2024 0.1151 0.0092 
27 Basic metals 0.0069 0.3458 0.1019 0.0098 
28 Metal products 0.0096 0.2866 0.1150 0.0141 
29 Machinery and equip 0.0232 0.3079 0.0871 0.0116 
30 Office and computing 0.1205 0.5342 0.0396 0.0085 
31 Electrical machinery 0.0318 0.3464 0.0960 0.0097 
32 Radio and tv 0.1054 0.6421 0.0728 0.0076 
33 Scientific instruments 0.1053 0.7956 0.0485 0.0037 
34 Motor vehicles 0.0166 0.3745 0.1159 0.0175 
35 Other transport 0.0206 0.1966 0.1120 0.0109 
36 Furniture and other manufacturing 0.0177 0.5102 0.0935 0.0100 
 Average across all industries 0.0371 0.3614 0.0947 0.0144 
 Average across high-tech only 0.1515 0.7495 0.0092 0.0050 
 Average across non high-tech only 0.0117 0.2751 0.1137 0.0164 
Panel B: Correlations across industry characteristics 
 
Innovative 
intensity 
External 
finance 
Cash flow Income taxes  
Innovative intensity 1 
   
 
External finance 0.667 1 
  
 
Cash flow -0.930 -0.775 1 
 
 
Income taxes -0.337 -0.710 0.544 1  
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Table 3 
Innovation policy and industry R&D intensity 
Table 3 reports OLS estimates of equation (2). The dependent variable is the industry R&D-to-value added ratio 
(R&D). In Panel A, country policy variables are interacted with a continuous measure of industry Innovative 
intensity constructed from U.S. data. In Panel B, country policy variables are interacted with a High-tech 
indicator variable that takes the value of one in industries with ISIC codes 24, 30, 32, 33. In addition to the 
interaction terms, each regression includes full sets of industry and country-year dummy variables. The reported 
standard errors are robust to clustering in the country dimension.  All variables are defined in Table 1. 
  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Country policy interacted with industry Innovative intensity 
R&D tax credits × -0.859    -0.745  
Innovative intensity (0.372)** 
   
(0.297)** 
 
Change in tax credits ×  -0.162    -0.124 
Innovative intensity 
 
(0.051)*** 
   
(0.045)** 
IP protection ×   0.344  0.259 0.274 
Innovative intensity 
  
(0.073)*** 
 
(0.080)*** (0.080)*** 
Accounting standards ×    0.172 0.129 0.111 
Innovative intensity 
   
(0.036)*** (0.035)*** (0.036)*** 
       
Constant 0.032 0.032 0.035 -0.013 0.027 0.029 
 (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.007)*** (0.009) (0.007)*** (0.007)*** 
Observations 5,606 5,606 5,606 5,606 5,606 5,606 
R-squared 0.632 0.634 0.642 0.641 0.653 0.653 
Panel B: Country policy interacted with industry High-tech dummy variable 
R&D tax credits × -0.134    -0.117  
High-tech (0.089) 
   
(0.077) 
 
Change in tax credits ×  -0.034    -0.027 
High-tech 
 
(0.011)*** 
   
(0.009)*** 
IP protection ×   0.054  0.037 0.040 
High-tech 
  
(0.016)*** 
 
(0.016)** (0.016)** 
Accounting standards ×    0.033 0.027 0.023 
High-tech 
   
(0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)** 
       
Constant 0.032 0.032 0.035 -0.013 0.027 0.029 
 (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.007)*** (0.009) (0.007)*** (0.007)*** 
Observations 5,606 5,606 5,606 5,606 5,606 5,606 
R-squared 0.632 0.638 0.642 0.649 0.658 0.662 
 
 
 
35 
Table 4 
Comparing alternative financial market rules 
Table 4 reports OLS estimates of equation (2). The dependent variable is the industry R&D-to-value added ratio 
(R&D). In addition to the interaction terms, each regression includes full sets of industry and country-year 
dummy variables. The reported standard errors are robust to clustering in the country dimension.  All variables 
are defined in Table 1. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
R&D tax credits × -0.485  -0.799  -0.492  
Innovative intensity (0.384)  (0.359)**  (0.342) 
 
Change in tax credits ×  -0.117  -0.155  -0.085 
Innovative intensity 
 
(0.042)**  (0.050)*** 
 
(0.048)* 
IP protection × 0.175 0.183 0.355 0.355 0.158 0.164 
Innovative intensity (0.081)** (0.082)** (0.079)*** (0.077)*** (0.072)** (0.075)** 
Accounting standards ×     0.091 0.078 
Innovative intensity 
 
   (0.032)** (0.035)** 
Contract enforcement × 0.174 0.168   0.188 0.191 
Innovative intensity (0.061)** (0.054)***   (0.073)** (0.070)** 
Creditor rights ×   -0.038 -0.029 -0.086 -0.082 
Innovative intensity 
 
 (0.049) (0.045) (0.035)** (0.034)** 
       
Constant 0.023 0.023 0.033 0.039 -0.017 -0.018 
 (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.009)* (0.009)* 
Observations 5,606 5,606 5,606 5,606 5,606 5,606 
R-squared 0.653 0.655 0.646 0.648 0.661 0.661 
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Table 5 
Quantifying the economic effects of changes in innovation policy 
Table 5 reports estimates of the economic magnitude of the coefficients reported in the final regression in Table 
4. The differentials compare how (all else equal) a change in the policy variable from the 25
th
 to 75
th
 percentile 
affects the gap between R&D investment across industries with different Innovative intensity. In the first two 
rows we compute the predicted R&D differentials by comparing industries at the 75
th
 percentile and 25
th
 
percentile in Innovative intensity. In the final two rows we compute the predicted R&D differentials by 
comparing the average Innovative intensity across the high-tech sector to the corresponding average in the low-
tech sector.   
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Change in policy variable from 25
th
 – 75th percentile: 
 
Change in 
tax credits 
IP 
protection 
Accounting 
standards 
Contract 
enforcement 
Creditor 
rights 
R&D differential effect computed as:       
 
75
th
 – 25th pct in Innovative intensity / 
sample avg R&D 
-0.02 0.03 0.03 0.05 -0.05 
 
75
th
 – 25th pct in Innovative intensity /  
sample median R&D 
-0.07 0.08 0.09 0.15 -0.14 
 
HT – non HT in Innovative intensity /  
sample avg HT R&D 
-0.06 0.07 0.07 0.12 -0.11 
 
HT – non HT in Innovative intensity /  
sample avg HT - non HT R&D 
 
-0.07 0.08 0.09 0.15 -0.14 
 
  
 
 
37 
Table 6 
Innovation policy and industry R&D intensity: Estimating effects using long-run averages  
Table 6 reports OLS estimates of equation (2). The dependent variable is the industry R&D-to-value added ratio 
(R&D), averaged over 1990-2006 in columns (1)-(5) and 1990-1999 in column (6). In addition to the interaction 
terms, each regression includes full sets of industry and country dummy variables. The reported standard errors 
are robust to clustering in the country dimension. All variables are defined in Table 1. 
  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
R&D tax credits × -1.342   -0.682 -0.578 -0.487 
Innovative intensity (0.572)**   (0.448) (0.454) (0.356) 
IP protection ×  0.682  0.493 0.261 0.157 
Innovative intensity 
 
(0.131)***  (0.137)*** (0.230) (0.164) 
Accounting standards ×   0.169 0.093 0.086 0.097 
Innovative intensity 
 
 (0.035)*** (0.041)** (0.030)** (0.034)** 
Contract enforcement ×     0.169 0.213 
Innovative intensity 
 
   (0.091)* (0.076)** 
Creditor rights ×     -0.085 -0.106 
Innovative intensity 
 
   (0.034)** (0.037)** 
       
Constant 0.059 0.040 0.055 0.041 0.035 -0.005 
 (0.007)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.007) 
Observations 382 382 382 382 382 379 
R-squared 0.704 0.724 0.712 0.730 0.736 0.696 
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Table 7 
Innovation policy and industry R&D intensity: Alternative industry characteristics 
Table 7 reports OLS estimates of equation (2). The dependent variable is the industry R&D-to-value added ratio 
(R&D). In addition to the interaction terms, each regression includes full sets of industry and country-year 
dummy variables. The reported standard errors are robust to clustering in the country dimension. All variables 
are defined in Table 1. 
  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Country policy interacted with industry: 
 External finance Cash flow Income taxes 
R&D tax credits × -0.139  0.718  2.401  
Industry characteristic (0.053)** 
 
(0.266)** 
 
(0.588)*** 
 
Change in tax credits ×  -0.022  0.103  0.306 
Industry characteristic 
 
(0.008)** 
 
(0.044)** 
 
(0.091)*** 
IP protection × 0.041 0.044 -0.261 -0.276 -0.538 -0.608 
Industry characteristic (0.015)** (0.015)*** (0.077)*** (0.079)*** (0.240)** (0.236)** 
Accounting standards × 0.027 0.023 -0.113 -0.098 -0.793 -0.687 
Industry characteristic (0.009)*** (0.009)** (0.031)*** (0.033)*** (0.194)*** (0.211)*** 
       
Constant 0.150 0.146 0.222 0.215 0.115 0.109 
 (0.035)*** (0.032)*** (0.041)*** (0.037)*** (0.016)*** (0.017)*** 
Observations 5,606 5,606 5,606 5,606 5,606 5,606 
R-squared 0.642 0.642 0.644 0.644 0.635 0.634 
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Table 8 
Innovation policy and industry R&D intensity: Alternative estimation approaches 
Table 8 reports OLS estimates of equation (2). In columns (1) and (2) the dependent variable is the industry R&D-to-output ratio. In columns (3)-(6) the dependent variable is 
the industry R&D-to-value added ratio (R&D). In addition to the interaction terms, the regressions in columns (1)-(8) include full sets of industry and country-year dummy 
variables, while the regressions in columns (9) and (10) include country-industry fixed effects in place of the industry dummy variables. The reported standard errors are 
robust to clustering in the country dimension. All variables are defined in Table 1. 
  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
R&D-to-output as the 
dependent variable 
Innovative intensity 
computed 
over the 1980s 
Add GDP and Human 
capital interactions 
Control for industry growth 
options 
Country-industry 
fixed effects 
R&D tax credits × -0.382 
 
-1.915 
 
-0.839  -0.727  -0.111 
 
Innovative intensity (0.115)*** 
 
(1.178) 
 
(0.271)***  (0.381)*  (0.173) 
 
Change in tax credits × 
 
-0.049 
 
-0.427  -0.125  -0.159 
 
0.002 
Innovative intensity 
 
(0.020)** 
 
(0.147)***  (0.042)***  (0.052)*** 
 
(0.020) 
IP protection × 0.064 0.071 0.681 0.726 0.199 0.230 0.272 0.297 0.110 0.105 
Innovative intensity (0.028)** (0.030)** (0.266)** (0.265)** (0.084)** (0.090)** (0.090)*** (0.091)*** (0.048)** (0.047)** 
Accounting standards × 0.051 0.046 0.421 0.360 0.101 0.088 0.146 0.119   
Innovative intensity (0.018)** (0.021)** (0.142)*** (0.136)** (0.036)** (0.036)** (0.040)*** (0.041)***   
GDP per capita × 
  
  0.023 0.019     
Innovative intensity 
  
  (0.033) (0.037)     
Schooling × 
    
0.452 0.377     
Innovative intensity 
    
(0.304) (0.308)     
Industry growth        0.031 0.031   
       (0.014)** (0.014)**   
           
Constant -0.116 -0.108 -0.008 -0.004 0.010 0.010 0.001 0.008 0.047 0.048 
 (0.028)*** (0.029)*** (0.014) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.005) (0.004)* (0.007)*** (0.007)*** 
Observations 5,197 5,197 5,606 5,606 5,387 5,387 4,469 4,469 5,606 5,606 
R-squared 0.680 0.677 0.664 0.667 0.653 0.652 0.650 0.652 0.217 0.214 
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Table 9 
Industry level R&D user cost regressions 
Table 9 reports OLS estimates of equation (3) with log (R&D)i,j,t as the dependent variable. Log (output) is the 
industry-country-year value of sales and log(B-index) is the log of the country-year value of the B-index. In 
column (1) we use all 22 manufacturing industries, in column (2) we only include the 18 non-high tech 
industries, and in column (3) we only include the four high-tech industries. Country, industry, and year dummies 
are included in all regressions. Reported standard errors are robust to clustering in the country dimension.  
 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
Full sample 
(all industries) 
Only non high-tech 
industries 
Only high-tech 
Industries 
    log (output) 0.838 0.834 0.994 
 
(0.053)*** (0.056)*** (0.115)*** 
log (B-index) -0.010 -0.014 0.001 
 
(0.003)*** (0.005)*** (0.010) 
        
Adj. R-squared 0.857 0.849 0.872 
Nr of observations 4,205 3,545 660 
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Table A.1 
Country characteristics 
 
Countries 
Accounting 
standards 
Contract 
enforcement 
Creditor rights IP protection 
R&D tax 
credits 
First year of 
tax credits 
Australia 75 8.71 3.00 3.90 0.16 1985 
Austria 54 9.60 3.00 4.13 0.07 1992 
Belgium 61 9.48 2.00 4.53 -0.01 
No R&D tax 
credits 
Canada 74 8.96 1.00 4.16 0.17 1962 
Denmark 62 9.31 3.00 4.40 -0.01 
No R&D tax 
credits 
Finland 77 9.15 1.00 4.16 -0.01 
No R&D tax 
credits 
France 69 9.19 0.00 4.40 0.09 1983 
Germany 62 9.77 3.00 4.25 -0.05 
No R&D tax 
credits 
Greece 55 6.62 1.00 3.54 -0.01 
No R&D tax 
credits 
Italy 62 9.17 2.00 4.38 -0.04 
1992 for small 
firms 
Japan 65 9.69 3.00 4.36 0.02 1967 
Korea 62 8.59 3.00 3.95 0.09 1988 
Mexico 60 6.55 0.00 2.86 0.09 1997 
Netherlands 64 9.35 3.00 4.50 0.07 1994 
Norway 74 9.71 2.00 3.88 0.04 2002 
Portugal 36 8.57 1.00 3.26 0.11 1997 
Spain 64 8.40 2.00 4.07 0.34 1990 
Sweden 83 9.58 1.00 4.31 -0.02 
No R&D tax 
credits 
UK 78 9.63 4.00 4.48 0.04 2001 
Correlations across country characteristics 
 
Accounting 
standards 
Contract 
enforcement 
Creditor rights IP protection 
R&D tax 
credits 
Accounting standards 1     
Contract enforcement 0.347 1 
  
 
Creditor rights 0.077 0.512 1 
 
 
IP protection 0.459 0.794 0.487 1  
R&D tax credits -0.049 -0.253 -0.088 -0.246 1 
 
